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Housing in Post-Katrina New Orleans: Legal
Rights and Recourses for Displaced AfricanAmerican Residents
Rob Wilcox ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Hurricane Katrina dramatically changed the lives of more than one million
Americans, evoking passion and tension around the nation. Katrina’s devastating impact
has left hundreds of thousands of Americans without adequate shelter and without a
guaranteed prospect for shelter. 1 Rebuilding New Orleans will take years, and a pressing
question is for whom the city will be rebuilt. New Orleans flooded because the federal
and municipal government failed to fulfill their promise to build and maintain a viable
levee system. 2 Currently, the city is facing extreme racial tension and could be facing a
major racial and economic transformation. 3 The city may shrink its city limits or
footprint, effectively excluding former residents. 4 This Comment will establish that any
reduction of the city’s footprint that has a disproportionate impact on African-American
residents will violate the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA). 5
The stated goal and hope of the rebuilding effort is to rebuild New Orleans for all
interested residents. 6 This Comment will address an alternative scenario—a plan for
New Orleans that excludes vast numbers of African-American residents who want to
return, dramatically altering the city’s racial makeup. All of the residents relied on the
government to protect them from flooding; it is unfair to subject only African-American
residents to relocation after the government failed to keep its promise. The FHA can
protect African-American residents from public officials and private developers whose
decisions have a disparate impact on the African-American community. AfricanAmerican residents who would be displaced through rebuilding can ask a federal court,
∗

I would like to thank the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy staff, Professor Len Rubinowitz,
and my lovely wife, Jessa DeSimone.
1
See generally A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans: J. Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Transp. & Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Public Bldgs. and Emergency Mgmt., Subcomm. on
Water Resources and Env’t., 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/02oct20061230/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
25915.pdf [hereinafter A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans].
2
John Warrick & Peter Whoriskey, Army Corps is Faulted on New Orleans Levees, WASH. POST, Mar. 25,
2006, at A6.
3
Ann M. Simmons, Racial Current Runs Through This Campaign, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at A4.
4
Gordon Russell, Officials Tiptoe Around Footprint Issue, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 8, 2006,
at 1.
5
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
6
President George W. Bush, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address from the City of New
Orleans Shortly After Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/katrina/archive.html.
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either under a declaratory judgment act or after plans have been released, to order that the
rebuilding plan not violate the anti-discrimination principals of the FHA.
Former residents who lost their homes must have the means to secure the housing
that they both need and deserve. This Comment will begin with an overview of the city
of New Orleans before the hurricane, and will then briefly touch on Hurricane Katrina’s
impact on the city. Next, it will examine the statutory rights vested in the FHA. This
Comment will then analyze FHA jurisprudence in multiple jurisdictions, examining
theories behind past FHA claims, the legal standards established in those cases, how
plaintiffs were able to satisfy FHA standards, and the types of remedies historically
provided by the legal system. After such legal and historical examination, this Comment
will synthesize past case law with the unique facts at hand and propose a provocative
remedy.
II. OVERVIEW OF NEW ORLEANS BEFORE HURRICANE KATRINA
A. Population

¶4

¶5

New Orleans is a city with a distinct racial makeup. The New Orleans metropolitan
area consists of seven parishes and has a total population of just over 1.3 million people,
making it the fifty-fourth largest metropolitan area in the country. 7 The 2000 Census, the
last census prior to Hurricane Katrina, reported that the city of New Orleans had 485,000
residents, and was the thirty-first largest city in the country. 8 The city’s population
consisted of 325,927 African-Americans (sixty-seven percent) and 135,956 whites
(twenty-eight percent). 9 There were 113,136 African-American households with fortythree percent of African-Americans owning their homes. 10
The media coverage of the evacuation of New Orleans has reintroduced our country
to racial segregation. The coverage after Katrina showed a city with deep racial
divisions. However, the segregation in the city was not the result of hundreds of years of
discrimination but was actually a more recent occurrence.11 New Orleans has always had
a high percentage of African-Americans, but until recently racial groups were not isolated
by geographic boundaries. 12 The city’s transformation took place over the past fifty
years. 13 By 2000, the average African-American resident in New Orleans lived in a
neighborhood in which eighty-two percent of the population was African-American (a
proportion that is considered “highly segregated”). 14
7

The seven parishes are Orleans (City of New Orleans), Jefferson, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles,
St. John the Baptist, and St. Tammy; U.S. Census Bureau Census 2000, Summary File 1 (SF 1).
8
THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM: LESSONS FROM THE
PAST, A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 4 (2005), available at
http://media.brookings.edu/mediaarchive/pubs/metro/pubs/20051012_NewOrleans.pdf (citing U.S. Census
Bureau, Census 2000) [hereinafter NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM].
9
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, SF 1 and Summary File 3 (SF 3) (2000).
10
THE BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, KEY INDICATORS OF ENTRENCHED POVERTY (2005),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/20050920_povertynumbers.pdf [hereinafter KEY
INDICATORS].
11
NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
12
Id. at 5 (citing PEIRCE LEWIS, NEW ORLEANS: THE MAKING OF AN URBAN LANDSCAPE (1976)).
13
Id. at 4.
14
Id. at 6.
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Paralleling this segregation was the clustering of those living in poverty. Fortythree percent of poor African-Americans lived in areas of concentrated poverty, while
only eleven percent of poor whites lived in such areas. 15 The most striking example of
this concentrated poverty is the Lower Ninth Ward, where there was a thirty-six percent
poverty rate and high incidences of crime and violence. 16 Public housing data shows that
in 2005 there were 17,913 publicly subsidized housing units, all occupied by AfricanAmericans. 17 White flight in the form of urban sprawl, without the justification of high
population density in existing developed land, presents one theory as to why race has
become more concentrated. 18
B. Economy

¶7

¶8

New Orleans has long struggled with economic depression, but it has the economic
potential and vitality to draw workers, investors and industry back to the city. The
cultural uniqueness of the city makes it a tourist destination. Also, the Port of New
Orleans is the largest “through put” port in the United States, 19 handling more than 430
million tons of cargo annually. 20 The area produces thirty percent of the crude oil and
twenty percent of the natural gas produced in the United States. 21 Additionally, forty
billion barrels of oil reserves were recently discovered in the Gulf of Mexico. 22 The
coastal wetlands create a nursery for much of the nation’s seafood, with more than fortyfive percent of the nation’s shrimp and thirty-five percent of the nation’s oysters being
caught in the area. 23
Despite these economic opportunities, the city’s metropolitan area has an eighteen
percent poverty rate, making it the sixth poorest out of the hundred largest metropolitan
areas in 2000. 24 In 2000, the median household income was $35,317—the fourth lowest
out of the hundred largest metropolitan areas in the United States. 25 Job growth in the
New Orleans metropolitan area has lagged behind national trends. 26 Non-farm
employment in New Orleans increased by fifty-four percent from 1970 to 2000, while the
national growth rate over the same period was eighty-seven percent. 27 Economic growth

15

ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, KATRINA’S WINDOW: CONFRONTING CONCENTRATED POVERTY ACROSS
AMERICA 10 (The Brookings Institution 2005), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20051012_Concentratedpoverty.pdf.
16
Gwen Filosam, ‘I Came to See What God Had Done,’ NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 28, 2005, at
A1.
17
KEY INDICATORS, supra note 10.
18
NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM, supra note 8, at 10.
19
A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 68.
20
Press Release, The Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment and The Subcommittee on
Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management to Hold Joint Hearing on
A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans (on file with author) [hereinafter Vision and Strategy
Press Release].
21
Id. at 56.
22
Vision and Strategy Press Release, supra note 20.
23
Id.
24
NEW ORLEANS AFTER THE STORM, supra note 8, at 4.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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opportunities exist in a number of industries, but New Orleans must be adequately rebuilt
before tourism or other industries return. 28
III. HURRICANE KATRINA
¶9

While Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans on many levels, it also offers an
opportunity to rebuild a city that had slipped into patterns of racial segregation and
economic depression. In President Bush’s speech to the nation after the hurricane, he
stated that in New Orleans and surrounding parishes, it is no longer safe to live in more
than a quarter million houses. This leaves hundreds of thousands of people who need to
find longer-term housing. 29
¶10
A U.S. Representative from the affected region estimated that 228,000 occupied
housing units had been flooded—more than forty-five percent of all usable housing. 30 A
flooded structure can often be rehabilitated, but extensive damage to the foundation or
support structure requires demolition. 31 The storm damaged the city’s most vulnerable
areas, with thirty-eight of New Orleans’s forty-nine extreme poverty census tracts
flooded. 32 It could cost up to $61.5 billion to address the environmental impact of
Katrina, with thirty-five billion dollars needed to restore the wastewater treatment
infrastructure and nearly twenty-five billion dollars needed to assess and dispose of
hazardous wastes. 33
¶11
Mtumishi St. Julien, Executive Director of the Finance Authority of New Orleans,
stated that as of October 18, 2005, 40,000 people were still in shelters, another 150,000
were in hotels, and an additional 150,000 or more were staying with relatives. 34 “The
city is virtually empty,” he said. 35 The massive scale of the destruction in addition to the
emptiness of the city will allow for city planners to focus on rebuilding a city that can
withstand another Katrina, but could also lead to the exclusion of many of the city’s
former residents.
IV. REBUILDING
¶12

The government has responded to Katrina at the federal, state and local levels. On
October 18, 2005, the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment and the
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency
Management held a joint hearing on “A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New
Orleans.” 36 The Subcommittees made clear that “to be effective, New Orleans and its
28

A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 54-55.
President George W. Bush, supra note 6.
30
A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 11-12 (statement of Rep. William J.
Jefferson). The 228,000 total includes 120,000 owner-occupied units and 108,000 units occupied by
renters.
31
Vision and Strategy Press Release, supra note 20.
32
Id. The U.S. census bureau defines census tracts as small, homogenous, relatively permanent statistical
subdivisions of a county averaging about 4,000 inhabitants.
33
36 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1889, 1916 (2005).
34
A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New Orleans, supra note 1, at 199 (statement of Mtumishi St.
Julien, Executive Director, The Finance Authority of New Orleans).
35
Id.
36
Id. at I.
29
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citizenry will have to create a comprehensive plan for the rebuilding effort, including
clear long-term goals, public participation and measurable outcomes.” 37 New Orleans
Mayor C. Ray Nagin announced the formation of the “Bring New Orleans Back
Commission” on September 30, 2005, the same day the New Orleans City Council said it
would form its own advisory commission. 38 Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco also
created a twenty-four member commission, the Louisiana Recovery Authority, which
will focus on the rebuilding of South Louisiana. 39 Although legislative and
administrative bodies have been formed, there are pressing questions about the
government’s role, as well as the need for a concrete rebuilding plan.
A. Government’s Role after Prior Disasters
¶13

The government will have an active role in the rebuilding process. The 1906 fire in
San Francisco, California and the 1900 hurricane in Galveston, Texas, provide two of the
more recent examples of the necessary partnership between government and the private
sector when an entire community is destroyed. 40 In each case, government money made
up only a portion of the total expenses, while most of the rebuilding was done by private
individuals. 41 The government played a major role in ensuring public safety by taking
decisive and tangible steps that provided an essential public reassurance to traumatized
citizens and focused on creating a level playing field. 42 However, in response to a more
recent natural disaster, the government did not provide adequate, integrated housing.43
The government’s response to Hurricane Charley has failed to provide adequate relief or
opportunity for the most vulnerable among those affected, leaving many of the
hurricane’s victims in a government-run trailer park filled with drugs and crime and far
from opportunity. 44
B. Public Planning

¶14

A number of legislative proposals and reports have been floated as possibilities for
rebuilding the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina, and a few of those options are
summarized below.
¶15
The states affected––Mississippi, New Orleans, and Alabama––will rely on the
federal government to provide revenue, and large federal aid packages have already been
passed. 45 In December 2005, Congress passed a $29 billion aid package for the Gulf
region. 46 The package gave Mississippi about five times as much per household in
housing aid as it gave Louisiana––a testimony to the clout of Governor Haley Barbour of
Mississippi, a former Republican National Committee chairman, and Mississippi Senator

37

Vision and Strategy Press Release, supra note 20
Gary Rivlin, Divisions Appear with Storm Recovery Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at A29.
39
Id.
40
Anna Bernasek, Blueprints from Cities that Rose from Their Ashes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at C3.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Peter Wilkinson, Welcome to Nowhere Pop. 1,062, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 17, 2005, at 58.
44
Id.
45
Adam Nossiter, A Big Government Fix-It Plan for New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2006, at A1.
46
Id.
38
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Thad Cochran, chairman of the Appropriations Committee. 47 All of the affected states
are currently lobbying the federal government for more funds. The “Bring New Orleans
Back Commission” is playing a large part in the rebuilding effort and recently released a
master urban plan to rebuild New Orleans. 48
¶16
Representative Richard H. Baker, a Republican from suburban Baton Rouge, is
advocating for a housing recovery plan that would make the federal government the
biggest landowner in New Orleans. 49 Representative Baker’s proposed Louisiana
Recovery Corporation would spend as much as eighty billion dollars to pay off lenders,
restore public works, buy large ruined chunks of the city, clean them up and then sell
them back to developers. 50 Under the plan, the Louisiana Recovery Corporation would
prevent citizens from defaulting on their mortgage payments by offering to purchase
homeowners’ homes, at no less than sixty percent of the equity they held in the property
before Hurricane Katrina. 51 Property owners would not be required to sell their land, but
such a sale would come with the option to purchase the property back from the
corporation after the rehabilitation. 52 The federal corporation would have nothing to do
with the redevelopment of the land, with the plans being drawn up by local authorities
and private developers. 53
¶17
Another plan relies on the pre-storm market value of homes. The plan would offer
owners of flood-damaged houses a choice between a government buyout at full, prestorm market value, or a renovation grant to cover most repairs. 54 If the administrators of
the plan classify a house as “severely flooded”—meaning that the home took on roughly
two feet of water or more—then the home owner would be eligible for a buyout at full
pre-Katrina market value, minus any monies previously received in insurance. 55 When it
comes to renovation grants, the government will distinguish between homeowners with
flood insurance, and those without. Homeowners with flood insurance could receive a
grant of up to eighty percent of the difference between their renovation costs and any
insurance coverage, while homeowners without flood insurance—regardless of whether
the homeowner lived in flood zone— could only receive, at most, a renovation grant that
would cover sixty percent of the costs. 56
¶18
Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco’s main housing assistance bill would create
the Louisiana Housing and Land Trust Corporation, “which would use billions of
available federal dollars to provide home buyouts, loans and grants in devastated
parishes.” 57 The bill is designed to “help homeowners rebuild and recover from the
47

Id.
See BRING NEW ORLEANS BACK COMMISSION URBAN PLANNING COMMITTEE, ACTION PLAN FOR NEW
ORLEANS: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY (2006), available at
http://www.bringneworleansback.com/Portals/BringNewOrleansBack/Resources/Urban%20Planning%20A
ction%20Plan%20Final%20Report.pdf.
49
Nossiter, supra note 45, at A1.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Gordon Russell, Frank Donzo & Laura Maggi, Buyout in Works, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb.
13, 2006, at A1.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Melinda Deslatte, Blanco, Lawmakers Scramble to Wrap Up Work by Friday Session End, ASSOCIATED
48
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hurricanes and would minimize blighted neighborhoods and large tracts of abandoned,
ruined housing.” 58 Most importantly, the federal government, speaking through Donald
Powell, President Bush’s chief federal hurricane recovery adviser, indicated that it is
“important that there be some ‘vehicle’ to spend the federal housing aid coming to
Louisiana.” 59
¶19
Loren C. Scott, an emeritus economist at Louisiana State University, stated that
Representative Baker’s plan is “probably one of the few last best hopes out there for
people whose homes were flooded, and had no flood insurance.” 60 Professor Scott went
on to say that “[w]ithout this kind of help, there’s a very large number of people who are
just sunk.” 61 The same can be said for the local buyout plan, since it mirrors
Representative Baker’s plan in many ways.
¶20
Any rebuilding plan should be inspected for blatant and intentional efforts to
exclude racial minorities as well as certain facially neutral techniques that may have
substantial discriminatory effects. 62 Louisiana State University Professor Craig Colten
concluded that the previous design of New Orleans placed racial minorities in locations
where flooding would have a greater impact. 63
C. Political Landscape
¶21

Public officials have painted the rebuilding effort as an opportunity to combat the
social ills found in New Orleans. 64 Addressing the public from in front of the historic St.
Louis Cathedral, President Bush stated:
When communities are rebuilt, they must be even better and stronger than
before the storm. . . . As all of us saw on television, there is also some
deep, persistent poverty in this region, as well. That poverty has roots in a
history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the
opportunity of America. We have a duty to confront this poverty with
bold action. So let us restore all that we have cherished from yesterday,
and let us rise above the legacy of inequality. 65

¶22

President Bush offered a pledge that the area hit by the hurricane will have the
support of the federal government for “as long as it takes, to help citizens rebuild their
communities and their lives.” 66 Furthermore, he stated that although there are important
PRESS, Feb. 17, 2006.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Nossiter, supra note 45, at A1.
61
Id.
62
See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1081-82 (5th ed. 2002) (explaining that
discriminatory effects can manifest as controls on minimum housing cost, minimum housing size, and
minimum lot size; related techniques including prohibitions on mobile homes and multifamily houses).
63
See CRAIG E. COLTEN, AN UNNATURAL METROPOLIS: WRESTING NEW ORLEANS FROM NATURE 77
(Louisiana State University Press 2005) (“With greater means and power, the white population occupied
the better-drained sections of the city, while blacks typically inhabited the swampy ‘rear’ districts.”).
64
See generally President George W. Bush, supra note 6; A Vision and Strategy for Rebuilding New
Orleans, supra note 1.
65
President George W. Bush, supra note 6.
66
Id.
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decisions and many details to resolve, some “clear principles” have been established. 67
President Bush promised that the federal government will be “fully engaged in the
mission,” but that “Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin and other state and local leaders will
have the primary role” in planning the rebuilding. 68
¶23
Some local officials have taken notice of the need to assure protection against
rebuilding plans that would have a discriminatory effect. At a “Bring New Orleans
Back” Commission meeting, Commissioner Oliver Thomas asked his fellow
commissioners to commit formally to rebuilding the Ninth Ward—an impoverished,
largely African-American and heavily damaged area. 69 Commissioner Thomas's
resolution passed unanimously without debate, with one abstention. 70 However, the vote
prompted both black and white commissioners to assess the wisdom of making
commitments before they have had a chance to discuss an issue and its alternatives. 71
¶24
Rebuilding and repopulating New Orleans becomes more urgent when one
considers that other communities will be unwilling or unable to permanently accept an
influx of displaced New Orleans residents. The Governor of Texas, Rick Perry,
explained that there are currently no recognizable long-term housing solutions in his
state. 72 Governor Perry stated that Texas is incapable of supporting evacuees without a
considerable increase in federal aid. 73 At the Congressional Subcommittee hearing,
Mayor Nagin stated that New Orleans can get back up to 300,000 or 350,000 people with
the help of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), but beyond that, the
city will need major housing loans and other help. 74 President Bush urged that
communities move decisively to change zoning laws and building codes, in order to
avoid a repeat of the disaster when the city is rebuilt. 75 However, in his speech he
referenced “clear principles” that will guide the rebuilding effort, 76 and one of those
principles must be rebuilding without discriminating against the African-American
community of New Orleans.
V. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
A. Goals & Purposes
¶25

The Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly know as the Fair Housing Act (FHA),
staked out a beachhead against discrimination and segregation in housing. 77 Residents of
New Orleans will find shelter under the umbrella of the FHA if the federal, state or local

67

Id.
Id.
69
Rivlin, supra note 38.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Eric Lipton, Hurricane Evacuees Face Eviction Threats at Both Their Old Homes and New, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2005, at A20 (“Our communities cannot be expected to support such a large evacuee population on
a long-term basis without substantial federal aid.”).
73
Id.
74
Edward Epstein, Congress’ Role After Storm Debated, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2005, at A6.
75
President George W. Bush, supra note 6.
76
Id.
77
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
68
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governments attempt to rebuild New Orleans in a way that has a discriminatory impact on
African-Americans.
¶26
The language and interpretations of the Act provide bite to the grand principal that
“[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States.” 78 The key section prohibits discrimination
“against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 79
¶27
The Supreme Court of the United States has not explicitly interpreted the breadth,
depth and scope of the FHA, but has, at times, discussed its purposes and goals. One
important decision, Trafficante v. Metro Life Insurance Co., did not interpret the
substance of the Act, but did state that the FHA is governed by broad and inclusive
purposes. 80 The Court identified the “benefits from interracial association,” and did not
limit standing to only those at whom discrimination is aimed. 81 The Court held that the
FHA protects individuals if discrimination affects their daily lives. 82 The Court ended its
discussion with the hope that the FHA will “replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and
balanced living patterns.’” 83 Lower courts have relied on statements that fair housing is
“more important than jobs, and even more important than equal protection under the
law,” as well as the lofty instruction that “we must turn our face away from a course of
segregation and separation.” 84
¶28
While the FHA has panoply of features, Section B will explore how the FHA has
specifically been used when governments have made decisions that have a discriminatory
racial impact.
B. Disparate Impact Claims
¶29

The Federal Circuits agree that a successful FHA claim can be made by showing
that a government decision has or will have a discriminatory impact on a protected
class. 85 The judiciary will act to remedy a flawed housing situation or program after the
plaintiff or class is able to show that the decision has a substantial discriminatory
impact. 86 FHA claims can be brought against government or private actors and a court’s
analysis differs depending on who the defendant is. 87 Residents and evacuees of New
Orleans will be able to bring suit against the federal government, the government of New

78

Id.
Id.
80
409 U.S. 205, 209-14 (1972).
81
Id. at 211 (noting that “[t]he person on the landlord’s blacklist is not the only victim” of discrimination,
the Court was referring to the statement of FHA supporter Senator Javits, who emphasized that
discrimination harms the “whole community”).
82
Id. (quoting Shannon v. U. S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 818 (3d Cir. 1970)).
83
Id. (quoting Senator Walter Mondale, 114 CONG. REC. 2706, 3422 (1968)).
84
NAACP v. Sec. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Senator Javits’s and
Representative McCormack’s statements made during Congressional debates over the FHA, 114 CONG.
REC. 2275, 2703 & 9616).
85
Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986) (and cases cited therein).
86
Id.
87
Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and
Lending Law, and the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 435-43 (1998).
79
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Orleans, or the private developers contracted to rebuild the city. 88 However, this
Comment focuses entirely on a potential plaintiff’s remedies in the face of a
governmental decision that has a disparate impact.
¶30
Before analyzing the different circuits’ handling of FHA cases, it is important to
distinguish an FHA analysis from an equal protection analysis. The equal protection
“impact plus” standard developed in Arlington Heights I, 89 which requires a showing of
discriminatory intent, is not the proper test for an FHA claim, which only requires a
showing of a discriminatory effect. 90 After the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’
equal protection claim in Arlington Heights I, the Seventh Circuit on remand decided
Arlington Heights II, where it found a valid cause of action under the FHA. 91
¶31
FHA jurisprudence has never dealt with such a large housing program; most claims
focus on a single building, a discrete housing project or a specific zoning decision. This
section will synthesize a number of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals’ FHA decisions to
demonstrate that a claim brought against the entire New Orleans rebuilding effort fits
within the scope of the FHA. By examining a number of FHA cases, it becomes clear
that although the FHA has never been applied to a citywide project or decision, the
collection of FHA actions adds up to a metropolis worth of action. This section will
initially look to the Fifth Circuit, a New Orleans resident’s appropriate forum, before
examining cases that have come from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits.
1. The FHA in the Fifth Circuit
¶32

The Fifth Circuit is the appropriate forum for a New Orleans resident to bring an
FHA claim. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit has not decided many cases under the FHA,
so it lacks the full and vibrant jurisprudence necessary to guide a complex analysis. 92
The available case law indicates, however, that the Fifth Circuit is generally in agreement
with other Circuits on the basics––an FHA plaintiff need only show a discriminatory
effect to be successful.
¶33
A 1986 case, Hanson v. Veterans Administration, stands for the principle that a
violation of the FHA would be established not only by proof of discriminatory intent, but
through the showing of a significant discriminatory effect on a protected class. 93 The
Hanson Court’s brief analysis of the FHA cited a Sixth Circuit case, Arthur v. City of
Toledo, with an affirmative nod towards the cases cited by that court in support of the
discriminatory effect test. 94 In Hanson, the court reviewed statistical studies produced by
the plaintiffs and concluded that the district court’s decision was not clearly erroneous in

88

See generally id.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. (Arlington Heights I), 429 U.S. 252, 266-67
(1977).
90
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 558 F.2d 1283, 1290
(7th Cir. 1977).
91
Id.
92
But see Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Hanson v. Veterans Admin.,
800 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1986); Woods-Drake v. C.L. Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982).
93
800 F.2d at 1386.
94
Id. at 1386 (relying on Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 1986) (and cases cited
therein)).
89
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finding plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to establish discriminatory effect. 95 Although the
plaintiffs in Hanson did not present enough evidence to meet their burden, the court
stated that statistical evidence alone, if convincing, is sufficient to meet the burden
imposed under the FHA. 96 The Fifth Circuit’s case law does not indicate that the FHA
contemplates a claim against an entire city’s building plan; the following analysis,
however, will demonstrate that decisions from other circuits point to this conclusion.
2. The FHA Four Factor Analysis: Arlington Heights II
¶34

A landmark case in FHA jurisprudence occurred on remand from the United States
Supreme Court. 97 In Arlington Heights II, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s
equal protection claim, while holding there was a valid FHA claim, differentiating the
two causes of action. 98 The court established four analytical factors that measure whether
the FHA has been violated. 99 The Seventh Circuit examined: (1) the strength of the
plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect, (2) whether there was any evidence of
discriminatory intent, (3) the government’s interest in taking the action complained of,
and (4) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel affirmative action or just to restrain the
defendant from interfering with market forces. 100 Although discriminatory intent was a
factor, the court held that it was the least important of the four, and is inversely related to
the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect. 101
¶35
The Seventh Circuit stated that a discriminatory effect inquiry asks two separate
questions––first, whether the government’s decision has had a greater adverse impact on
one racial group over another, and second, what effect the government’s decision has had
on the required community interest of integration. 102 The Seventh Circuit addressed the
second question as completely independent from the first. 103 The district court approved
a decision made by the Village of Arlington Heights to deny a rezoning request since it
was based on a desire to protect property values and maintain the prevailing zoning
plan. 104 The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that even without a showing of
discriminatory intent, the ultimate effect of the rezoning denial could be racially
discriminatory. 105
¶36
Municipalities acting within their scope of authority are given more deference than
private citizens, but are not allowed to systematically deprive minorities of housing
opportunities simply by using a racially neutral ordinance or instrument. 106 District
courts located in the Seventh Circuit are instructed to use a “statistical, effect-oriented
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view of causality” when determining the effects of a housing decision. 107 A
governmental entity is liable if the plaintiff can prove that the foreseeable consequences
of a government act or omission adversely affects a protected class and if the action
perpetuates racial segregation. 108
¶37
The Seventh Circuit established a useful four-factor analysis and clarified the
distinction between an equal protection and FHA analysis. 109 Furthermore, the court
allowed the omission of an act, in this case the refusal to rezone a tract of land, as
grounds for an FHA claim. 110
3. Refusing to Change Zoning Laws
¶38

The Eighth Circuit decided an early FHA case, and the principles it espoused have
become a guiding force in FHA jurisprudence. 111 The Eighth Circuit held that the
plaintiff was only required to prove that the government’s conduct “actually or
predictably results in racial discrimination.” 112 The United States brought an action under
the FHA to challenge a City of Black Jack zoning ordinance preventing new construction
of multifamily homes. 113 The case focused on a municipal zoning ordinance and the
effect the ordinance would have on African-Americans. 114 The district court found for
the City of Black Jack, holding that the ordinance had no greater effect on AfricanAmericans than whites. The court specifically found that the proposed housing
development––meant for families earning between $5,000 and $10,000––was designed to
meet the needs of thirty-two percent of the African-American population and twenty-nine
percent of the white population. 115
¶39
The Court of Appeals found this decision to be in error because the lower court
failed to account for either the “ultimate effect” or the “historical context” of the city’s
action. 116 The Court of Appeals examined the housing statistics throughout the
metropolitan area even though the case only considered a discrete ordinance. 117 In doing
so, the Court of Appeals found that the ordinance affected eighty-five percent of AfricanAmericans living in the metropolitan area at a time when forty percent of the AfricanAmericans in the metropolitan area were living in “substandard or overcrowded units.” 118
¶40
The discriminatory effect of the ordinance became more “onerous” when the court
assessed it in light of the history of segregated housing. 119 The Court of Appeals viewed
the zoning decision as “but one more factor confining blacks to low-income housing.” 120
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Thus, the Eighth Circuit case law highlights that affirmative legislative zoning decisions,
even when facially neutral, must be viewed for their “ultimate effects” on a protected
class and in light of the “historical context.” 121
4. Compelling the Construction of Public Housing
¶41

The Third Circuit in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo found that individuals
eligible for low-income public housing had a successful action against the city of
Philadelphia and the federal government for terminating construction on the Whitman
Townhouse project. 122 The court established a probative level of judicial review with
little deference due to facially reasonable acts of the government. 123 The plaintiffs sought
to compel the construction of the Whitman project—a project to be undertaken in a
predominantly white neighborhood of Philadelphia. 124 The court determined that the
failure to undertake this project had a “greater adverse effect on nonwhite people than on
white people” based on three factors: (1) the project’s waiting list was ninety-five percent
minority, (2) the Whitman neighborhood had recently segregated racially, and (3)
Philadelphia had a history of racial segregation. 125
¶42
The court considered historical context and found that the city, along with local and
federal housing authorities, helped to transform an integrated neighborhood (in 1960,
forty-six percent of the families were African-American) to one that was non-integrated
(by 1970 there were virtually no African-American families in the area). 126 The court
was very concerned with the rise in segregation and was willing to use its equitable
power to order the city and housing authorities to proceed with construction. 127 The court
concluded that “the Whitman project, when built and tenanted, would restore a measure
of racial integration to an all-white portion of Whitman,” thus providing an opportunity to
create an integrated, non-racially-impacted environment.128 The government’s opposition
to this project had the “undeniable effect of ‘bear[ing] more heavily on one race than
another.’” 129
¶43
The court was careful to tailor the equitable relief to be no more intrusive than was
necessary to remedy the specific FHA violation complained of. 130 The court of appeals
overturned the district court’s order that the Philadelphia Housing Authority integrate all
of Philadelphia’s public housing, because the plaintiffs had not requested that type of
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remedy. 131 The court did affirm the district court’s order that the Whitman project be
built, compelling action from the other branches of government. 132
¶44
The Rizzo case illustrates that the termination of a housing project may violate the
FHA and that the judiciary possesses the equitable power to compel the actual
construction of a building, 133 going beyond the administrative change in zoning law seen
in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington. 134 The court in Huntington
Branch invalidated a municipal ordinance that restricted the development of private
multifamily housing project––to be inhabited by minorities––to a largely minority urban
renewal area and forbade the construction in a white neighborhood. 135 Under the FHA, a
district court may compel the executive branch to act, as seen in Rizzo, or make what is
traditionally a legislative decision, as seen in Huntington Branch.
5. Rebutting a Prima Facie Case
¶45

The First Circuit in Langlois v. Abington Housing Authority discussed two
alternatives for rebutting a prima facie case of housing discrimination. 136 The First
Circuit agreed with the district court that proof of discriminatory effect establishes a
prima facie case. 137 However, the court disagreed with how the district court “balanced”
the government’s justification for the discrimination against the effect of the
discrimination. 138 The court juxtaposed the Seventh Circuit’s view that a court’s job is to
balance the magnitude of discriminatory effect against the justification 139 with an
alternative view that relied on a “simple justification test.” 140 The First Circuit held the
government must demonstrate that “the disparate impact in housing [is] justified by a
legitimate and substantial goal.” 141 That court relied on a Supreme Court case 142 and
legislative history 143 to show that the government’s preference for local residents was
substantial and served as proper rebuttal to the showing of a disparate impact. 144 It is
noteworthy that the First Circuit had difficulty applying the HUD regulations requiring
integrated housing in the rebuttal analysis. 145 The court referred to the analysis as
presenting a “mare’s nest of problems” and only began to untangle the cobweb of HUD
regulations that require local Public Housing Authorities to act affirmatively in providing
fair housing. 146
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6. Remedies

¶46

The Second, Third and Fourth Circuits present the various equitable remedies
available to plaintiffs who succeed under the FHA. 147 The Third Circuit compelled the
federal and local government to construct public housing and discussed the ability of the
judiciary to order the desegregation of an entire public housing system. 148 The Second
Circuit altered a zoning ordinance––traditionally a legislative function––to allow for
private construction of low-income housing. 149
¶47
The Fourth Circuit articulated certain limits on the judicial power, restricting the
ability to require affirmative action to specific circumstances. 150 In Smith v. Town of
Clarkson, the Fourth Circuit used the Arlington Heights II four-factor analysis to find an
FHA violation but overturned the district court’s order that required the town to construct
fifty housing units. 151 The court held that requiring the local government to spend local
revenue was beyond the district court’s power, and that a district court could only order
the construction to go forward under a “good faith” requirement, leaving open the
possibility that unnecessary delays or stalling could be remedied by court order.152 The
court, however, limited this restriction on a district court’s equitable power to the
circumstances of the case and took care to stress that the local authority only had access
to local monies, leaving open the possibility of a different result if federal funding was
involved. 153
¶48
These three circuits illustrate the significant remedial powers that courts possess,
especially when dealing with a municipality that receives significant federal assistance.
VI. NEW ORLEANS’ AFRICAN-AMERICAN RESIDENTS CAN FIND PROTECTION UNDER THE
FHA
¶49

Hurricane Katrina damaged over a quarter of a million homes 154 and the
participating government entities could decide to rezone, rebuild, buy out, or condemn
homes or entire neighborhoods. 155 This decision would come on the heels of the
government’s failure to keep its most important promise––to protect its residents.156 The
Army Corps of Engineers assured city leaders that the levees were strong, which in turn
led the city to permit building in areas traditionally reserved as wetlands. 157 AfricanAmericans populated the areas that were more vulnerable to flooding. 158 Shrinking the
city’s footprint in order to restore the wetlands is permissible and maybe even advisable,
147
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but that decision must conform to the anti-discriminatory principles of the FHA. The city
could approach the shrinking of the footprint in a variety of ways. This shrinking might
have an extraordinary impact on African-Americans by changing the city’s racial makeup
from one that is predominantly African-American to one that is predominantly white. In
fact, the city has already begun to redevelop along those lines. 159
A hypothetical African-American plaintiff who has lost her place in the New
Orleans footprint will be able to assert that she has suffered a concrete injury, namely the
loss of her home. A more difficult question is whether the injury is causally connected to
government action or more properly attributable to Katrina. While Katrina may have
damaged or destroyed a person’s home, it is the government that approved building
within the city’s footprint. Furthermore, once the government initiates a recovery plan, it
is responsible for crafting a plan that complies with the FHA and does not have a
discriminatory impact. If the plan affects a resident’s housing options by either altering
her neighborhood or displacing her from the city’s footprint, then there will be a causal
connection between that person no longer having a place to live within the New Orleans
footprint and the specified government action.
Focusing on the potential footprint shrinking, the question remains whether the
FHA is designed to cover the African-American residents excluded from the new
footprint. Applying the FHA to the rebuilding of an entire city will exceed the scope of
any prior FHA case, yet this does not mean that the FHA is inapplicable. FHA
jurisprudence forms a mosaic that closely resembles the rebuilding of an entire city.
Proving an FHA violation will require residents to show a substantial discriminatory
effect 160 and more importantly, to show that the FHA is the proper legal instrument for
vindicating their rights.
The FHA is the proper legal instrument, even with a project as massive as the
rebuilding of an entire city. Past FHA cases have focused on discrete programs inside the
microcosm of a metropolitan area, but when extrapolated, the case law resembles the
rebuilding of an entire city. The cases examined thus far all had discriminatory effects,
but the methods of discrimination were different. The Third Circuit illustrated that the
executive department’s termination of a housing project could violate the FHA. 161 The
Second Circuit overturned a decision not to change a zoning law because the failure to
change the zoning law perpetuated segregation. 162 The Eighth Circuit held that a
legislative decision to change a zoning law, even if facially neutral, cannot have the
ultimate effect of disparately impacting racial minorities. 163 This range of cases covers
many of the possible government actions that may occur during the rebuilding.
An African-American resident of New Orleans displaced from the new footprint
will be able to satisfy the substantive discriminatory effects test of the FHA and ask a
court to construct a remedy. The proper substantive legal inquiries would be whether the
government’s decision has a greater adverse impact on one racial group over another and
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what effect the government’s decision has on the required community interest of
integration (the perpetuation of the segregation issue). 164
¶54
The first inquiry, whether there is a disparate impact, requires the court to examine
the entire footprint of New Orleans before and after Katrina. The alternative would be to
examine the effect a single decision has on a discrete neighborhood. However, this
would be improper because (1) the rebuilding decisions are made in concert and not in
isolation, and (2) courts have traditionally looked outside the four corners of the affected
area to determine impact. 165 Examining how the FHA applies to the rebuilding of an
entire city may be easiest to understand when the rebuilding is broken into discrete
projects. However, to fully understand the specific legal rights of African-American
residents and to properly remedy their FHA claims, the project must be viewed as
encompassing the entire New Orleans footprint prior to Katrina. Prior to Katrina, New
Orleans had half a million residents and almost seventy percent of them were AfricanAmerican. 166
¶55
Only when an individual’s loss of housing is measured against the housing capacity
for the entire city can the discriminatory effect be properly realized and remedied. The
Eighth Circuit’s examination in City of Black Jack represents the proper way to analyze
an FHA question. 167 The Eighth Circuit widened the lens to examine how the decision to
build housing in the City of Black Jack would affect the African-American population of
the entire metropolitan area. 168 The court found that the ordinance affected eighty-five
percent of African-Americans living in the metropolitan area, at a time when forty
percent of the African-Americans in the metropolitan area were living in substandard or
overcrowded units. 169 Similarly, a district court examining the rebuilding decisions being
made in New Orleans should examine how the decisions affect the African-American
population of the entire city and not simply one neighborhood. Looking at the rebuilding
through that lens will allow the court to properly comprehend whether the shrinking of
the footprint has a discriminatory effect. Any new footprint must have racial proportions
that are similar to those from pre-Katrina New Orleans.
¶56
Similar circumstances on a smaller scale led to an FHA violation in the Fourth
Circuit. 170 In Betsey v. Turtle Creek Association, the Fourth Circuit found an FHA
violation when an apartment complex conversion to an all-adult policy had a substantially
greater adverse impact on minority tenants. 171 In making that determination, the court
looked to how the policy affected the tenants subjected to it and found that the policy
change would result in over fifty-four percent of African-Americans being evicted as
opposed to only fourteen percent of whites. 172 This type of analysis of a New Orleans
footprint reduction plan could show similar results. If the results indicate a radical
164
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change in racial percentages with an adverse impact on African-Americans, then the
same type of violation that occurred in Betsey would be found in New Orleans.
¶57
Depending on what balancing test is appropriate for rebutting a prima facie case,
the government will either have to contend that the disparate impact on housing is
justified by a “legitimate and substantial” goal 173 or show that the balance of the
magnitude of discriminatory effect against the justification is in its favor. 174 The
government could posit that in order to protect the city from a repeat of Katrina, it is
necessary to scale the footprint back and rely on wetlands as a natural defense. Thus, the
shrinking footprint’s disparate impact would be based on science and not on prejudice.
¶58
However, a reviewing court should follow the lead of the Eighth and Third Circuits
by looking at the “historical context” when reviewing rebuilding decisions. 175 The
historical context shows two prevailing conditions: first, the city was segregated, and
second, African-Americans lived in the most dangerous portions of the city. 176 By 2000,
an average African-American resident in New Orleans lived in a neighborhood in which
eighty-two percent of the population was also African-American (a proportion that is
considered “highly segregated”). 177 Moreover, Louisiana State University Professor
Craig Colten concluded that the previous design of New Orleans placed racial minorities
in locations where flooding would have a greater impact. 178 This context should color the
rebuilding decisions in New Orleans in favor of African-Americans since there is an
unfortunate history of both segregation and circumstances pointing to discriminatory
intent.
¶59
As a defense, the government could also assert either that it is not preventing
African-Americans from using the market to return to the new footprint or that it is
providing more than adequate compensation in terms of buyout options for the displaced.
Neither defense would rebut a prima facie FHA case since the issue is not whether
African-Americans could return, but rather whether they are being displaced.
Furthermore, the government’s defense would be comparing apples and oranges, as it is
well known that the housing stock in the predominantly African-American
neighborhoods is not as valuable as the housing stock in mixed or predominantly white
neighborhoods. This disparity in wealth means that, even if African-American
homeowners are compensated at one hundred percent of pre-Katrina value for their
property, that income will be substantially less than the value of most property within a
new footprint.
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VII.

REDISTRIBUTING HOUSING STOCK

¶60

The Rizzo case indicates that the judicial system is willing and able to invalidate
massive housing projects so long as there is a discriminatory effect in the project’s
operation. 179 Examples of massive remedial plans can be found in the invalidation of
state-wide educational systems—instances where the state court demands correction of
the problem but does not mandate a specific performance. 180
¶61
Although New Orleans cannot shrink its footprint in a way that has a
discriminatory impact, it can shrink its footprint. The city could either (1) redraw the
footprint in a way that does not have a discriminatory impact or (2) redistribute the land
within the footprint to include persons who would otherwise be excluded. The first
option requires tactical but feasible line-drawing, but the second will take the raw
exertion of governmental power and will appear much more controversial.
¶62
The second option would require the city to use its eminent domain and zoning
powers simultaneously. To reduce the footprint fairly, the city would have to condemn
areas and return them to wetlands while also seizing areas in the new footprint. The
seized properties will most likely belong to whites, and the city would have to order their
redevelopment and resale. This remedy goes to the heart of obligation. A person living
inside the footprint has an obligation, embodied in the FHA, to make sacrifices in order
for the city to rebuild equitably.
¶63
The plan may be unpalatable for some and may even be characterized as an
unconstitutional quota system. 181 However, this remedy is not based on granting
homeownership rights to African-Americans simply because they are African-American.
Rather, it is based on granting such rights because these African-Americans are former
residents who are being discriminated against based on their race. This remedy sounds
extreme since it will displace two families instead of one, but the racial scars in our
history, which spawned the FHA, and Professor Colten’s suggestion that AfricanAmericans were intentionally placed in harm’s way, both lead to the conclusion that
subjecting one race to greater punishment because of the New Orleans government’s
failure to provide adequate levee protection would be unfair.
VIII.
¶64

CONCLUSION

The rebuilding of New Orleans could take many years. There will be many
difficult decisions to make before the city is rebuilt. In addition, there will come a point
when mainstream America loses interest and political will demanding equality in the
rebuilding process dissipates. Physics and topography may dictate that land use
restrictions need to be implemented to protect future residents and the city itself from a
repeat of the devastation caused by Katrina. 182 However, the city deserves a thoughtful
and fair rebuilding plan. New York Times columnist David Brooks pointed out that
Katrina presents an opportunity to solve some of the social problems that have afflicted
179
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New Orleans by mimicking a Gautreaux-style 183 integrated rebuilding plan. 184 Residents
affected by Katrina––especially those underserved during the recovery effort—need to
feel confident that the rebuilding plan is centered on principles of inclusion, opportunity,
and diversity.
¶65
In the unfortunate instance that the government creates a plan that has a
disproportionate discriminatory effect, African-American residents will be able to use the
FHA for protection. FHA cases taken from around the country demonstrate that although
the FHA has not been used on such a wide scale before, it certainly can be. The residents
do not have a right to housing in New Orleans, but if the city is rebuilt, the housing
decisions must not, in the aggregate, have a discriminatory effect on African-Americans.
If the political branches do not protect the interests of former residents, then the federal
courts must intercede to demand that this be done.
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